I-Love-Ptichtot

A Session about Tanhuma in the Internations SBL in Amsterdam

2011-09-04T07:33:00.000-07:00

ISBL Amsterdam, 22-26 July 2012

Call for Papers

Tanhuma is a wide and diverse corpus of literature created by rabbinic culture in the Land of Israel roughly at the same period as the Babylonian Talmud. Although the Tanhuma was a wide spread and dominant literary corpus, it fell into oblivion at some point during the following centuries, ‘losing’ the place to the Talmud in Medieval Europe, and to other more ‘classical’ midrashim in modern scholarship.

The aim of these series of session of the SBL is to call attention again to the Tanhuma corpus, and to the culture that it represents.

At the first stage we would like to keep the scope of presentations as wide as possible, tackling all the aspects that can be studied about the Tanhuma; here are some possible topics:

* A definition or description of the Tanhuma corpus

* The poetics of the Tanhuma

* The Tanhuma and the Babylonian Talmud

* Tanhuma’s journey into Europe

* The representation of the Tanhuma in the Geniza

* The culture which is represented in the Tanhuma

* Non-rabbinic influences on the Tanhuma

* Halacha and custom in Tanhuma

* Sources of the Tanhuma

* The place of the Tanhuma on the Jewish-rabbinic cultural continuum.

The idea is to invite the scholars that are working on the Tanhuma to participate regularly and discuss and learn this particular corpus, and hopefully come up with good quality publications, or even a common project.

Please send suggestions to the chair, Ronit Nikolsky (r.nikolsky@rug.nl)

Extra-textual Orally Memorized Traditions

2011-06-11T13:18:00.001-07:00

On Wednesday I joined my club “The Orcheeds” to an outing; we visited an artistically decorated mansion in Eelde, a chinese restaurant, and in between the two, we heard a lecture by one of the members, Cees Dekker. This is the topic of this post.
Cees talked about the phenomenon which he termed “encyclopedic notes”, that can be found in Medievl English manuscripts. These are notes which are written at the edge of the page.

Cees characterized these notes by six things which I don’t remember; but I do remember that they have nothing to do with the content of the text, that they are encyclopedic in nature (give condensed information) formed many times in lists with numeric elements (the temple of Jerusalem was so and so long, so and so wide, took so and so long to build, or: a man has 219 bones, 365 veins and 32 teeth [sounds familiar?], etc). He also said that many of these notes are found more than once in the corpus (he collected some 200 such notes); some are found earlier in Latin, and later in Old English. These manuscripts are from the tenth to the twelfth century.

Cees thinks that these notes let us glimpse into the education system of the society where they originate. According to him, the content (and formulation) of these notes are what was leaned in schools (monastic), and that they were memorized.

I think Cees published his findings in this article: ‘Anglo-Saxon Encyclopaedic Notes: Tradition and Function’, Foundations of Learning: The Transfer of Encyclopaedic Knowledge in the Early Middle Ages, ed. Rolf H. Bremmer Jr and Kees Dekker (Louvain: Peeters, 2007), 279–315. (I am not sure because I didn’t check the article, only heard him lecture about it, but the title seems to point to this same research).

I find Cees study very important. Here there is a proof that there is life outside the text, and not simply ‘life’, but intellectual memorized knowledge, which, except for these accidental cases of reader-boredom or whatever the reason was for people to write these notes, is completely absent from our eyes, and is usually not acknowledged.

Although this is a fact that everyone would agree with if asked, and it is a fact that historians constantly study in their own way (i.e. not doing all the philological research needed...), it is not a fact that is acknowledged in many of the studies which I read.

This knowledge, that information was available in antiquity orally, and in a formulaic manner, has a direct bearing on the study of midrash. Midrashic knowledge seems also, like the encyclopedic notes, be a corpus of knowledge comprised of small textual unites which are learned by heart. These textual units are attached to biblical verses, i.e. to each verse a textual unit is attached, which explains or interprets the verse.

I’ll give an example with which I am busy at the moment (I will lecture about it in the SBL in London in the beginning of July).

When The Holy One Blessed be He stood and said “I am the Lord your God” (Deut. 5:6) the mountains were shaken and the hills falling apart. And the Tabor came from Beit-Elim, and the Carmel from Aspamia, as it is said “As I live, said the King, whose name is the Lord of hosts, surely like Tabor among the mountains, and like Carmel by the sea, so shall he come” (Jer. 46:18), the one saying 'I was called' and the other was saying 'I was called'. When they heard from His mouth “who brought you out of Egypt” each of them stayed in its place saying – He only talked about those whom He brought out of Egypt.

(The underlined section is that one that will be reused in the later midrash; I will refer to it as the orally transmitted midrashic unit)

The point of this passage is that the mountains make the mistake of thinking that the event which God declares here is of a small-scale, because it is only intended to those coming out of Egypt, and therefore worthless, and they stop competing on the job.

A similar narrative is found in Genesis Rabba:

“Why are you shaken, mountains with bumps” (Ps. 68:17)...

Rabbi Yose explained that this verse is about the mountains:

When the Holy One Blessed be He prepared to give the Torah in Sinai, the mountains started running and debating with each other, the one saying: the Torah is given on me, the other saying: the Torah is given on me

The Tabor came from Beit-Elim, and the Carmel from Aspamia, as it is said “As I live, said the King, whose name is the Lord of hosts, surely like Tabor among the mountains, and like Carmel by the sea, so shall he come” (Jer. 46:18), the one saying 'I was called' and the other was saying 'I was called'.

The Holy One blessed be he said: Why are you shaken, mountains of peaks”, all of you are mountains, but all of you have bumps; what does this mean? Like in the verse (Lev. 21:20) “one with a bump or one who is too thin”

on all of you idolatry is committed.

But the mountain of Sinai, on which there is no idolatry {is} “the mountain which God wanted for His dwelling”

The orally transmitted midrashic unit, which we saw in the Mekhilta, is found in Genesis Rabba also. But other than this passage, the two composition tell a different story, even though there are common lines in the stories.

The differences are first of all that the narratives are different - one is not a copy of the other. Secondly, both start their story (which in the midrash is almost always an explanation of a verse) from a different verse (Mekhilta with Deut. 5:6, GenR with Ps. 68:17); thirdly, the messages of the two stories are different: in the Mekhilta, the mountains misunderstand the importance of the giving of the Torah, and in Genesis Rabba it is the vanity of the mountains, each wanting the important event of giving the Torah to happen on it. So, the mountains in the Mekhilta are ignorants, and in Genesis Rabba - vain. Now, it is not that the mountains were not vain in the Mekhilta as well, but this was not the point of the story. It is also true that in some things the stories are similar, this is logical, because both have the Bible as their cultural canon; but as a rule, these are two different stories.

But what is interesting for our purpose, is that both are using the same textual unit which I call the orally transmitted midrashic unit. This tell me that this the orally transmitted midrashic unit was part of the cultural canon of the two societies which created the two stories. Perhaps this unit was written at some point on a paper or parchment, just as the encyclopedic notes were written sometimes on the edges of the Old English manuscripts.

Toledot

2011-05-20T09:00:00.001-07:00

תנחומא בובר תולדות ד

ולמה זה לי בכורה

ורוח הקודש אומרת ולא חפץ בברכה ותרחק ממנו

ולמה זה לי בכורה

היו הבכורות מקריבין

עד לא הוקם המשכן היה העבודה בבכורות

וכל מי שהיה מקריב היה ראוי להתברך

מזבח

אדמה וגו אבא אליך וברכתיך.

אמר עשו

אין אותו האיש רוצה לא להקריב ולא להתברך

הטקסט פה משובש קצת צריך להיות

ולמה זה לי בכורה?

ורוח הקודש אומרת: ויאהב קללה ותבואהו, ולא חפץ בברכה ותרחק ממנו

היו הבכורות מקריבין יש להפנות למשנה זבחים יד ד, ולא לתלמוד): עד שלא הוקם המשכן היה עבודה בבכורות

וכל מי שהיה מקריב היה ראוי להתברך, שנאמר "מזבח אדמה תעשה לי וזבחתך עליו את עלתך

ואת שלמיך ואת צאנך ואת בקרך בכל המקום אשר אזכיר את שמי אבוא אליך וברכתיך". "ויאמר

עשו: הנה אנכי הולך למות ולמה זה לי בכורה?" אין אותו האיש רוצה לא להקריב ולא להתברך

Articles on culture and cogntion: The cognitive foundations of cultural stability and diversity

2009-12-29T10:01:00.001-08:00

Sperber, Dan & Hirschfeld, Lawrence A., "The Cognitive foundations of cultural stability and diversity", Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (2004), 40-46

Introducing concepts of negative and positive false domains.

p. 41
An evolved cognitive module if an adaptation to a range of phenomena that presented problems or opportunities in the ancestral environment of the species.

Its function i to process a given type of stimuli or input. These inputs constitute the proper domain of the module.

All inputs meeting the input conditions of a module constitute its actual domain. These inputs conditions can never be perfectly adequate.

Mismatch between domains
The mismatch between the proper and the actual domain of a module can result in part from exploitation of the module by other organisms.

The difference between the proper domain and the actual domain results in inputs being falsely attributed to certain modules.
Such can be false negatives (a snake looking like a wig, therefore not being recognized as a snake)
or a false positive: a stick looking like a snake, therefore falsely identified as a snake.

Table 1: domain for which strong developmental comparative and neurocognitive data exists:
Theory of mind
Folk biology
Number
Face recognition
Naive mechanics
Folk sociology

A great variety of cultural artifacts are aimed at specific modules.

p. 42
The effectiveness of these artifacts in turn helps xplain their cultural recurrence.
***** what effectiveness are they talking about?

THE CASE OF FOLK BIOLOGY
p. 43
The unique importance of animals and plans in ancestral environments .. suggest that a dedicated module might have evolve the governs the categorization of living kinds...
The similarities of fold taxonomies across cultures ... confirm this hypothesis.
However, the fact that inputs to this module come not just from direct experience ... but also .. from communication with other people allows expanding the actual domain of the module well beyond its proper domain.
*** this shows that the building of the module is primarily cultural.

cultural exploitation of the module: wolves, which are only encountered in zoos, are still represented as dangerous.

Culturally reinterpreted wolves have become superstimuli.
Modular processing of information about living kinds is similarly the basis for the variety of cultural exploitations lumped together in classical anthropological theory under the label of 'totemism'.

p. 44
THE CASE OF FOLK SOCIOLOGY
The cognitive demands of such reasoning (social grouping) is sufficiently specific and complex to suggest the possibility of a special purpose modular competence in naive or folk sociology.

Unlike the social lives of non-humans primates, human social life is thoroughly cultural. *** WHAT?! what does it mean "thoroughly"?

THE CASE OF SUPERNATURALISM
From a point of view informed both by cognitive science and evolutionary biology, the existence of such needs and the ability of religion to satisfy them are quite questionable.

Supernatural beings are not just impossible in nature. They blantantly violate thekind of basic expectations that are delivered by domain-specific cognitive mechanisms.
*** religion is not supernatural beings.

As argues by Boyer, it is this combination of a few strikin gviolation with otherwise conformity to ordinary expectations, that makes supernatural beings attention arresting and memorable, and rich in inferential potential.

p. 45
Representations of supernatural beings, ... spread and stabilize in different cultures because they function for one or several cognitive modules as superstimuli. ... typically comvine not just exaggerated but also paradoxical features with ordinary and essential ones... in falling in the actual domain of two different modules.

Conclusions

We agree with standard social science that culture is not human psychology write large and that it would make little sense to seek a psychological reductionist explanation of culture.

however psychological factors paly an essential role in culture.
Some of these .. factors have to do with emotion more than with cognition.

Articles on culture and cogntion: The Cental Role of Culture in Cognitive Evolution

2009-12-29T07:44:00.002-08:00

Donald, Merlin, "The Central Role of Culture in Cognitive Evolution: A Reflection on the Myth of the 'Isolated Mind'", (chapter 2 in some book)
concept of brain-culture coevolution.
p. 20: But cognition science still proceeds as if culture did not matter. The only major exception to this is developmental psychology.
p. 21: two people who have influenced: Lev Vygotsky, first to recognize the symbiosis of developing mind wih culture, and Jerry Bruner, who carried this realization into the modern era.
p. 22: In most species, culture, insofar as it exists at all, does not factor into the evoluionary picture in this way.
p. 24: thus, by changing the kinds of cognitive environments to which infants are exposed, symbolic cultures can have a major epigenetic impact on the mind.
p. 25: conventional coevolutionary theories allow only for a tight, inflexible fit between brain and culture.
p. 25: There is an additional factor that affects brain-culture interactions, and it results from the juxtaposition of a super-plastic brain with our highly innovative symbolic cultures. Future generations can adjust to their drastically changed epigenetic environment without genetic change, through assive cultural intervention in their development.
P. 25: literacy developed in the New Stone Age, 5,000 years ago.
p. 28ff: about encultured apes
p. 29: human features: erect posture, changed vocal anatomy, increased brain volume.
p. 30: analysis of the apes' behaviour
p. 30: thus, just as Kanzi, we are also illusory creatures, products of an incessant process of cultural revolution that has kept raising the intellectual bar higher and higher.
p. 30: apes came close to human cognition as individuals, but they failed on the cultural side of the equation... apes continue to use symbols ony for a pragmatic personal agenda... collectively they have never been inclined to construct their own symbolic cultures... they never extended their use of symbols to hols anything resembling a conversation.

{my remark: perhaps the monkeys who were taught a language, but never learned to converse, prove that language in itself is not the issue; it is just a tool. the culture, its content, is the issue; but we still know nothing about how it came about. our facts are: brain is empty when born. it is filled by education and experience; this is done inter alia by language. the culture exists only in the brains of people}

p. 30-31: In their case, competence in the use of symbols was not sufficient to generate a cultural revolution, not even a very small one.
p. 31: In short, there seems to be more to generating culture than a sprinking of words and a smattering of grammar.
p. 31: Unthinkable as it may seem, we are not even certain that spoken language, as we know it, was part of our primordial profile as a species.
p. 31: our nervous systems are private entities, physically isolated from one another.
p. 32: We can escape from those little boxes and from our intellectual isolation in only one way - through action.
p. 32: The problem is that our brains can never produce truly symbolic acts unless they are imposed from the outside.
p. 32: people who grew up in isolation...never invented symbols.
p. 32: isolated brains ... never invent language, not even a "language of thought" ... we know from the post hoc testimony
p. 33: how culture (language) started is in his work of 1991.
p. 33: he develped the complex of "mimetic skill" (mapping elementary event perceptions, thus creating action metaphore, also: gesture, pantomime, re-enactive play, self reminding and more), thus creating "mimetic culture".
p. 33: Vygotsky's find: children imitate external language first, and do not have inital inner speech (1986). Language is first acted out, and only later internalized.
p. 33: the flow goes OUTSIDE ---> INSIDE
p. 33: this process began 2 million years ago.
p. 34: CONSCIOUSNESS and SELF-CONSTRUCTION. we have a hybrid consciousness, multilayered, complex. Consiousness is a product of our evolution.
p. 34: I had not yet realized that consciousness might be the engine of our cognitive evolution. But I am now convinced that it is.
p. 35: conscious capacity is essential to cultural survival because symbolic cultures hides their secrets from all but the most attentive mind. Their surface appearance is deceiving.
p. 35: CULTURE IS INVISIBLE, it is not immediately present in perception. It takes a long time to learn it.
p. 35: executive capacities were developed to cope with culture. it enables a human being to manage and supervise their own cognitive activities while analyzing the second and third ordr patterns of culture.
p. 36: a bad pun: executive suite.
p. 36: components of the executive suite are all associated with the conscious capacity: memory component (working memory), directional component (directing our attention cleverly), evaluative component (how things of now are connected to things of yesterday or tomorrow. nonhumans don't have it) and there are more.
p. 36: consciousness is essential for understanding culture because culture is un-predictable the needs maximal flexibility in order to generalize rapidly from concrete and from partial information.
p. 36: CONSCIOUS CAPACITY IS THE KEY EVOLUTIONARY FEATURE OF THE HUMAN MIND. IT PROVIDES OUR CONNECTION WITH CULTURE.
p. 37: we do have innately programmed skills, built into our brain at birth, but is pays a much smaller roe in the human case. We developed a symbiotic relationship with culture and a conscious capacity to self-assemble cognitive architerctures.

Articles on culture and cogntion: Evolutionary Origins of the Social Brain

2009-12-29T07:44:00.001-08:00

Donald, Merlin, "Chapter Eighteen: Evolutionary Origins of the Social Brain", in: Vilarroya, Oscar and Forn i Argimon, Francesc(a?), Social Brain Matters: Stances on the Neurobiology of Social Cognition, Amsterdam-New York: Rodopi (2007), 215-222.

p. 215
Cultural networks are a vital link in the human cognitive process. They greatly affect the way we carry out our cognitive business.
p. 216
What type of cognitive change would have enabled a group of archaic hominides to start developing a communication system that led eventually to the invention of highly variable and arbitrary ... distinctive grammars, and symbolic cultures?

In most species the range of possible behaviors is largely fixed in the genes and closely attuned to its ecological niche. This results in what is sometimes called a "specialist survival strategy".

Human beings have broken out of this morphological straitjacket. ... Where would such flexibility have begun to evolve? This question leads us logically back to the fundamentals of human motor skills and procedural learning. To learn... and individual must carry out a sequence of basic cognitive operations. Traditionally, these include rehearsing the action, observing its consequences, rememering these and then altering...varying the parameters dictated by the memory ... or by an idealized image.
p. 217
we might call {this}... a "rehearsal loop."

Apes appear to be quite poor at rehearsal and meta-cognitive review.
They can engage in socially facilitated imitation, but they cannot independently initiate and rehearse actions ... for the sole purpose of refining their movement sequences.

... in contrast, even young children routinely engage in practicing and refining such skills

a cluster of more basic capacities, including gesture, imitation, and voluntary rehearsal itself, appears to have a common underlying neuro-cognitive architecrture... I have called these components "mimetic kills", or mimesis.

Mimesis involved a revolution in motor skill but also rested on ... Hominids had to gain access to the content of their kinematic memories. Apes appear quite poot at this.

p. 218
... mimesis resides in an imaginative capability unique to human beings.
Human mimetic skills cut across all major sensory and motor modalities.

... we cannot easily reduce mimetic action to discrete or digital algorithms combined according to rules. Instead, it appears fuzzy in its logic, more like the visual recognition of faces.

p. 219

Hominids could not have evolved a capability for language ... without meeting the cognitive preconditions for inventing a morpho-phonology.

On present evidence, this level of mimetic skill would have sufficed to explain the major cognitive achievements of archaic Homo from about two million years ago until about 60,000. ...for evolving a set of shared expressive customs and for triggering a legacy of nonverbal culture.
Language ... came much later.

The cognitive development of human beings depends upon their links with culture.

... an individual mind is a wormhole in a vast culturally defined space. :)

p. 220
All cultural networks, even those of oral cultures, harness the cognitive resources of many individuals and impose a larger organization ... on the mental functioning of individuals.

The most important network-level resources of culture are undoubtedly writing and literacy.
... Oral cultures are limited to the biological memories of their members.

... The earliest literate cultures, such as those of Egypt, Mesopotamia and Chine, resembled one another in their style f cognitive governance, despite great differences in the substance of their traditions.

Institutions ... are not conscious entities ... but they are cognitive entities and they do perform cognitive work.

p. 221
{they{ rarely depend on single individuals over the long run. They dominate the minds of their members, and individuals assimilate institutional values to such an extent that they rarely violate them.

culture ... invisible knowledge-gathering apparatus that reaches over time and space into the minds of millions of people.

It is difficult for us to accept the degree of our dependency... we are its primary servants.

Articles on culture and cogntion: What belongs in a fictional world?

2009-12-29T07:42:00.000-08:00

Weisberg, Deena Skolnick and Goodstein, Joshua, "what belongs in a fictional world?", Journal of COgnition and CUlture 9 (2009), 69-78

The authors set out to check which fact from the real world people assign as true also in a fictional world.
p. 70
Previous works which they rely upon:
Ward, 1994; Ward and Sifonis, 197; Bredart et al 1998, which show that real world tends to constrain creative imagination.
Careiras et al. 1996 - about gender prejudices.
Kelly and Keil (1985) people tend to assign naturalistic structure to mythological beings.
Principle of Minimal Departure (Ryan, 1980; Lewish 1978; Walton 1990).
p. 71
They are checking in this study Distance (from the real world) and Fact Type.
They presented people with various types of stories and asked them whether various types of fact are true or not in the world of the story.
p. 72
three stories with different similarity to reality.
facts of four categories: mathematical, scientific (people have hearts), conventional (it is rude to pick one's nose), and contingent (Washington DC is the capital of the US).
p. 73
If story worlds are based on reality, we would expect that the test facts, whch were never mentioned in any of the stories, would generally be judged as true. This hypohthesis was confirmed.
p. 74
subjects judged facts in the close story as significantly more likely to be true than facts in the middle story, which were significantly more likely to be true that facts in the far story.
the same stair step pattern about facts from contingent (the least) to mathematical (the most) true in the stories.
reality judgment: people believed the close story was more likely to be true than the middle, etc.
p. 75
"...An alternative hypothesis is that people ue a variety of rules to guide their judgments, inferring what is true in a given story based on more than just a checklist of explicitly violated facts." There was evidence for two rules:
first: people are attuned to the distance that atory world lies from reality. the closer the story, the more real world facts are attributed to it.
second, people make distinctions between types of facts.

they checked how the few fact present in a story would affect readers' representation of the rest of the story world.
p. 76
their study took place off line; subjects had time to reflect.
"online measure such as eye tracking ... could help to determine how much information is contained in a story world as it is actively being constructed from the text." at this period fact from outside the story could be irrelevant.

(perhaps) we may not have at our fingertips all the facts that are true of the fictional world at any given time, but we can supply them if asked explicitly..

the principle of PUZZLE OF IMAGINATIVE RESISTANCE (Gendler, 2000, 2006; Weinberg and eskin, 2006; Matravers, 2003, Stock, 2005): when an author tries to write a story that violates of these fact, usually those about laws of logic and moral behaviour, readers will refust to imagenitively engage with the story or to create an appropriate fictional world.

Articles on culture and cognition-Donald, Role of Culture in Cognitive Evolution

Thursday, December 17, 2009 at 9:39pm | Edit Note | Delete

outline_for_the_volume-final

2009-07-24T13:03:00.001-07:00

Outline of the Volume Dedicated to Comparing
Babylonian and Palestinian Jewish Cultures

In recent years, publications appeared [1] showing the different manner in which early rabbinic material is reworked in the Babylonian Talmud on the one hand, and in Palestinian amoraic corpora on the other.

Following a successful ISBL session titled “Palestine and Babylon: Two Jewish Late Antique Cultures and their Interrelation”, we, Tal Ilan and Ronit Nikolsky, decided to produce a volume, based on the best contributions and on additional contributions from renown as well as young and promising new scholars devoted to the differences between these two Jewish centers.

The intention is that the volume would cover a wide range of Jewish late antique and Byzantine cultures, not only rabbinic culture, but other Jewish late antique and Byzantine corpora such as Hekhalot, Liturgy, or Magic.

The methodology to be used can be varied, as long as it studies culture. It may be purely philological, or it may focus on folklore, on philosophy, or on the legal approaches of the two centers. The strictness of the book is in three aspects: the period, that is late antique and Byzantine periods, amoraic to gaonic, from the fourth to the tenth century; the geographical provenance, Babylonia and the Land of Israel; and the comparative approach: studying and typifying the differences between the two cultures. Since the book will place culture at its focus, halakhic issues should be discussed in as much as they have cultural significance. One may rightly argue that most, if not all, halakhic issues have such significance. The intention of this statement is for the author to stress and focus on this aspect of halakhah.

The volume will also include a comprehensive bibliography on the topic.

The planned deadline for sending the contributions is the end of May 2010; the book is planned to be out by the end of 2010.

[1] An accidental and very partial list: Cohen, S. J. D., “The Conversion of
Antoninus,” in P. Schäfer (ed. ) The Talmud Yerushalmi and Greco-Roman
Culture (Tübingen 1998) 141-71; Friedman, Sh., “The Further Adventures of Rav
Kahana: between Babylonia and Palestine,
”, in Catherine Hezser and Peter Schcaefer (eds.), The Talmud Yerushalmi and
Graeco-Roman Culture, III. (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2002), pp. 247-271; Goodblatt, D., “The Beruriah Traditions,” JJS 26 (1975) 68-85; Hayes, C. E., Between the Babylonian and
Palestinian Talmuds: Accounting for Halakhic Differences in Selected Sugyot
from Tractate Avodah Zarah (Oxford
1997); Ilan, T., “‘Stolen Water is Sweet’: Women and
their Stories between Bavli and Yerushalmi,” in P. Schäfer (ed. ) The Talmud
Yerushalmi and Greco-Roman Culture (Tübingen 2002) III, 185-223; Kalmin, R., “Rabbinic Portrayals of Biblical and
Post-biblical Heroes”, in: Shaye J. D. Cohen (ed.), The Synoptic Problem in
Rabbinic Literature, (Brown Judaic Studies 326), Providence,
Rhode Island: Brown University,
2000, 119-144; Kiperwasser, R., D. Shapira, “Irano-Talmudica
I: The Three-Legged Ass and Ridya in B. Ta’anit: Some Observations about
Mythic Hydrology in the Babylonian Talmud and in Ancient Iran.”, AJS
Review 32:1 (2008), pp. 101–116; Lavee, M., “’Sarah Suckled Sons’: Models of
Jewish-Gentile Relations in a Midrashic Narrative”, Mishlav 37 (2002),
pp. 75-114 (Hebrew); Mandel, P., “Between Byzantium
and Islam: The transmission of a Jewish Book in the Byzantine and early Islamic
periods”, in Israel Gershoni and Yaacov Elman (eds.), Transmitting Jewish
Traditions, (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 2000), pp. 74-106; Noam, V., 'A Captive Story: the Adventures of a
Tales between the Land of Israel and Babylonia”, Jerusalem Studies in Hebrew
Literature 19 (2003), pp. 9-21 (Hebrew).

nikolsky-Ishmael

2009-07-20T04:08:00.001-07:00

Ishmael Sacrificed Grasshoppers

Ronit Nikolsky

Introduction

The interpretation of biblical verses and
narratives is apparent already in the Bible itself. Certainly by the
Second Temple Period exegetical explanation and expansion of the
biblical verses and stories were part of the Jewish culture. Such
expansions and exegesis, perhaps a result of the work of small study
groups, is prevalent in many Second Temple and Late Antique
compositions, such as Pseudepigrapha or the Dead Sea Scrolls. Much of
the material found its way into the rabbinic literature.^¹

The exegetical material found in rabbinic writings
varies in terms of its antiquity and origin. In the Tannaitic Period,
interpretive material was used as an argument in a halakhic debate.
Some interpretations stemm from oral traditions that were passed on
since the Second Temple Period, other interpretation are new, and at
time are even an ad-hoc creations constructed for literary purposes.
In order to study each of these cases separately, I will use the
concept of “exegetical motif.” An exegetical motif
is an idea, of how to explain a particular biblical verse. An
exegetical motif appears as a short explanation, supported by a
narrative unit that expands the biblical scene, usually termed a
“gap-filling story”; it illustrates the situation that is
not told in the biblical text.^²

Such exegetical motifs with narrative expansions
are found in the rabbinic literature with regard to Hagar.

The story of the expulsion of Hagar posed a
difficulty for the rabbis. The biblical text does not appear to give
a good enough reason for it, stating that “... Sarah saw the
son of Hagar the Egyptian, whom she had borne to Abraham, playing”
(Gen 21:9). After seeing Ishmael playing, Sarah demanded the
expulsion of Hagar and her son. Apparently, simply “playing”
did not seem to the rabbis to be a good enough reason for expulsion.

This issue comes up in a Tannaitic discussion in
the Tosefta, and solutions to the situation of the biblical scene are
suggested.

The solution that the rabbis found was to explain
the word “playing” in the verse in a way that would make
the story acceptable. The word was explained as indicating a grave
sin committed by Ishmael, one that would serve as a good reason to
expel him and his mother.

We find in the Tosefta four such explanations,
four different sins, which are four exegetical motifs used for the
word “playing” in the verse from Genesis. These are: 1.)
Ishmael was an idol-worshiper; 2.) Ishmael’s behavior was
incestuous; 3.) Ishmael was a murderer and 4.) Ishmael threatened
Isaac’s inheritance. Each of these sins is an appropriate
reason for Abraham to expel Hagar and Ishmael, and all four
exegetical motifs are found in one passage in Chapter 6 of Tractate
Sota in the Tosefta.

One of these motifs, namely the claim that Ishmael
was an idol-worshiper, appears in the previous chapter of the Tosefta
as well, in Chapter 5 of the same tractate.

In this article I will study the two passages
about the expulsion of Hagar and Ishmael found in the two chapters of
the Tosefta. I will try to trace the origin of the four exegetical
motifs found in Chapter 6. As to the motif that shows Ishmael as an
idol-worshiper, which appears in two separate chapters, I will try to
decide which of the two contexts is the original, if either of them.

1. Tosefta Sota 6:6

The verse about Hagar, which is interpreted
in the Tosefta 6:6, is Gen 21:9, “And Sarah saw the son of
Hagar the Egyptian which she bore to Abraham playing.” Three
exegetical motifs for this verse are said to come from sages of the
school of Rabbi Akiva. Alongside R. Akiva’s interpretation of
the verse, there are interpretations by two other rabbis. All these
Akivian interpretations are challenged by Rabbi Shimon son of Yochai
(henceforth, Rashbi), who then offers his own interpretation, which
is the fourth exegetical motif of this verse.

The passage begins with the
statement that “R. Shimon son of
Yochai said: Four things R. Akiva was learning [from the text] but my
opinion [about this verse] make more sense than his,” then
it runs as follows:^³

1.
R. Akiva learned, “And Sarah saw the son of Hagar the Egyptian
which she bore to Abraham playing (מצחק),”
the “play (צחוק),”^⁴
which is said here, means “idol worshipping.”

[We learn this when we look at the verse
in the narrative about the golden calf] which says (Exodus 32:6),
“The people sat down to eat, and they drank, and they rose to
play (לצחק).”

2. This teaches that Sarah our mother saw
Ishmael building bemas,^⁵
and hunting grasshoppers and sacrificing and burning incense to an
idol.

3. R. Eliezer, the son of R. Yose the
Galilean says: The [word] “playing”^⁶
means incest.

2b. [We learn this, when we look at the
verse in the narrative about Joseph with Potiphar's wife], which says
(Gen 39:17): “The Hebrew slave [which you brought to us] came
to me [to play (צחק)].”

4. This teaches that Sarah saw Ishmael
conquering the roofs and abusing the women.

5. R. Yishmael says: the word “play”
refers to manslaughter.

[We learn this when we look at the verse]
which says (2Sam 2:16) “[And Abner said to Joab:] let the young
men rise and play^⁷
before us. And Joab said: Let them rise. And they rose and passed by
the number, and held each other’s head, and [each] his sword at
the side of the other, and they fell [dead] together.”

6. Teaching [us] that our mother Sarah
saw Ishmael take bow and arrow and shoot it toward Isaac, as it says
(Proverbs 26:18-19), “As a madman who throws firebrands... so
is the man who deceives [his neighbor and says ‘I am only
playing!’^⁸],”
etc.

7. But I say [i.e., Rashbi]: God forbid
that there will be such in the house of this pious man! Is it
possible, in the house of one about whom it is told, “for I
have chosen him that he may charge his children and his household
after him to keep the way of the Lord” (Gen 18:19), etc., that
there will be idol worshipping, incest and manslaughter?

Therefore, the “laughing,”
which is mentioned here, is about inheritance:

8. When our father Isaac was born to our
father Abraham everyone was glad, and they were saying, “A son
is born to Abraham, a son is born to Abraham, he will inherit a
double portion of the inheritance!” And Ishmael was laughing in
his mind and saying, “Don't be fools, don't be fools, I am the
first-born, and I get the double portion.”^⁹

9. From the continuation of the
[narrative] I learn [this], since it says: “And she said to
Abraham, send away this slave-woman and her son, so that the son of
the maidservant will not inherit,” etc.

In his interpretation, R. Akiva (§1) studied
the usage of the word “playing” (מצחק)
in another biblical verse, namely in Exod 32:6. In Exodus the word
“to play” (לצחק)
describes the Israelites’ act of worshipping the golden calf.
R. Akiva takes the semantic context from the verse in Exodus over
into the narrative of the verse in Genesis, concluding that in the
verse in Genesis, the word “playing” refers to idol
worshipping as it did in the verse in Exodus. We learn that Ishmael
was an idol-worshiper and, therefore, the expulsion of him and his
mother was justified.

In what follows (§2) R. Akiva offers a
gap-filling story^¹⁰
that describes Ishmael’s idolatrous custom: Ishmael built
altars, hunted grasshoppers, sacrificed and burnt incense to idols.
Hunting grasshoppers in itself, and even eating them, is not
forbidden in Jewish culture,^¹¹
but the idea of sacrificing a grasshopper to an idol is puzzling; we
do not know of any such custom.^¹²
But while the nature of the act is not clear, the meaning of it in
the passage is obvious: it is an act of idolatry.

In the next sections (§§3-6) we find two
other interpretations of the word “playing” by two other
Tannaitic sages, R. Eliezer son of R. Yose ha-Glili and R. Yishmael.
They interpret the word “playing” using a technique
similar to the one used by R. Akiva, that is, comparing it with a
word of the same root in another verse, taking over the meaning from
the new verse to the Genesis narrative, and offering a gap-filling
story that expands the biblical narrative by using the new meaning of
the verse.^¹³

R. Eliezer, the son of R. Yose (who lived one
generation after the Bar-Kokhba revolt),^¹⁴
interprets the word “playing” as referring to an
incestuous act. He has understood this from the word לצחק
in the story of Joseph and Potiphar’s wife (Gen
39:17), where the word refers to sexual play. His gap-filling story
tells about Ishmael’s incestuous behavior.^¹⁵

The other sage, Rabbi Yishmael (of the same
generation as R. Akiva), understands the verse from Genesis as
referring to manslaughter. The biblical narrative, which R. Yishmael
quotes, is that of the young men of Joab and of Abner who “played”
(in fact, fought) until all of them were dead. The gap-filling story,
which R. Yishmael provides, tells how Ishmael was shooting arrows at
Isaac.

In this last gap-filling story, we find an extra
detail which was lacking in the other two gap-filling stories; this
story has a supporting verse (Proverbs 26:18-19):“as a madman
who throws firebrands and death, so is the man who deceives his
friend and says I am only playing (מצחק).”

In the final sentences of this passage (§7),
Rashbi criticizes the interpretations of the other Tannaitic sages.
He is not arguing directly against their interpretive method, but
against the conclusions that stem from these interpretations. It
cannot be imagined, says Rashbi, that such grave sins would have been
committed in the house of Abraham, about whom it is said (Gen 18:19),
“For I have chosen him that he may charge his children and his
household after him to keep the way of the Lord by doing
righteousness and justice.” From this verse we learn that
Abraham was a good educator and a good manager of his household and
one cannot imagine having idol-worshipping, incestuous behavior or
manslaughter in his house. Rashbi’s alternative interpretation
(§8) is not based on comparing the use of the word “playing”
in the Genesis verse to that in other biblical narratives. He
understands (§9) the verse in Gen 21:9 from its immediate
textual context, that is, the verse following it (Gen 21:10) that
reads, “For the son of this maidservant will not inherit
together with my son.” Since the next verse talks about
inheritance, says Rashbi, we can assume that the verse, “And
Sarah saw the son of Hagar the Egyptian which she bore to Abraham
playing,” also refers to inheritance. Here Rashbi offers his
own gap-filling story, describing Ishmael’s thoughts and
intentions concerning Abraham’s inheritance.

Methods of Interpretation

R. Akiva’s method of interpreting biblical
verses, as it appears in the Tosefta passage just studied, involves
understanding verse A by pointing to a similar lexical component in
verse B, and then interpreting verse A according to the semantic
field of verse B. This is an early rabbinic method of interpretation,
attributed to Hillel and is called “analogy” (gzera
shava).^¹⁶
The method of analogy ignores, in the first instance, the context of
the lexical components, and relies on the phonetic similarity. Later,
the context is introduced into consideration. Because of this initial
stage, this method can be called, using the (not very accurate, but
hopefully indicative) term, the “deconstructive method.”
The other examples of Akiva’s interpretative method are not
necessarily analogies, but they also exhibit the use of a single
aspect in the verse as a source for non-contextual understanding of
the verse in question, thus they are also deconstructive.

These examples of the deconstructive method are
actually not extreme ones, certainly not the most extreme
deconstruction that R. Akiva is said to be capable of. R. Akiva is
known not only to take a word out of its context; he can make
“mountains of interpretations” based on one letter.^¹⁷

Rashbi, on the other hand, proposes a method of
interpreting the text, which does not deconstruct it, but on the
contrary, understands the meaning of a sentence from its immediate
context. This method has ended up being known as “a matter
understood by its context,” or “a matter understood by
its end” (davar halamed me‘inyano or davar
halamed misofo), in the traditional lists of rabbinic
interpretive techniques (Bacher 1990, I, 142; Kahana 2006, 14). This
method does not appear to be popular in rabbinic literature. It
occurs considerably less often in the literature than do other
methods of interpretation.^¹⁸

The archeology of the passage in Tosefta Sota 6

The three interpretations of the school of R.
Akiva, put together, result in Ishmael committing what is conceived
of as three grave sins in the Jewish culture: idol-worshipping,
incest and manslaughter.

These sins are part of the list of seven sins,
which not only Jews but also Gentiles are expected to avoid. But it
seems that these three sins form a short list on their own in
Tannaitic literature. These sins are usually said to be committed by
Gentiles; in one case in the Tannaitic literature Israelites of the
early period also commit them. In all cases where there is a
reference to these three sins, it is a society and not an individual
which is the sinner. The gravity of the sins is made obvious by
connecting them to great calamities that befall the sinners.^¹⁹
When associating Ishmael with these sins, the Tosefta presents him
not only as a foreigner, a Gentile, but as a heavily sinful one as
well.

It is not necessary for Ishmael to commit all
three sins in order to be declared unwanted in the house of Abraham.
The existence of these three exegetical motifs certainly is
excessive. It seems that the reason behind piling up all these
explanation is a literary one: constructing a list of three offenses
that together form a well-known list (at least well known in the
Tosefta). Such an accumulation creates a literary tension, which is
waiting to be resolved. And indeed, following these three
interpretations, we find that the fourth one, that of Rashbi.
Rashbi’s interpretation overpowers all previous ones, and
serves as the solution to the literary tension created before. It is
the climax of the passage. The Tosefta passage is, then, a
well-structured literary text.

A closer look at the “building blocks”
of the passage reveals a discrepancy in the apparent symmetry. The
three exegetical motifs are not of the same exegetical value.

The second exegetical motif explains the word
“playing” as incest, an act belonging to the semantic
field of negative sexual activity. Although the most common meaning
of the root צחק
or שחק
in biblical Hebrew is to laugh, to sport or to play,
this root does appear in the biblical text in a sexual connotation as
well. One such case is the verse alluded to by R. Yosse (Gen 39:16);
another case where the sexual connotation is also very obvious is Gen
26:8, where “Abimelech king of the Philistines looked out of a
window and saw Isaac fondling (מצחק)
Rebecca his wife.” We see, then, that the interpretation of R.
Eliezer, the son of R. Yosse the Galilean, is not very innovative,
perhaps not an interpretation at all, but almost a straightforward
understanding of the verse.

The third exegetical motif leads us in a different
direction. We already noted above that the gap-filling story of this
motif, unlike the others, is supported by a biblical verse from
Proverbs. The text in the Tosefta explains, in fact, that the verse
(Proverbs 26:18-19), “As a madman who throws firebrands and
death, so is the man who deceives his friend and says I am only
playing,” refers to Isaac and Ishmael. This practice of showing
how verses from the later books of the Bible refer to events from the
Pentateuch is typical of rabbinic culture.^²⁰
This exegetical motif could, then, be quite old, originally
constructed around the verse in Proverbs and reworked by an editor or
author of the Tosefta into the context of Gen 21:9, which is under
discussion.

As opposed to the two motifs discussed above,
where we find a satisfying raison d’être, the
first exegetical motif, where the word “playing” is
explained as idol-worshipping, is the most unusual, and perhaps the
most innovative. Why would the word “playing” mean
idol-worshipping? One can conjecture a remote semantic connection if
one thinks of the word “playing” as referring to singing
and dancing, and if one then connects this to the singing and dancing
that perhaps took place in the worshipping of local gods. This move
does seem a bit conjectural, and in itself would not be a
sufficiently obvious explanation of Ishmael’s behavior. But R.
Akiva did, brilliantly, find the word “playing” in the
verse in Exodus 32:6 where the singing and dancing of the Israelites
is closely related to the worshipping of the golden calf. The
interpretive move in this case is indeed innovative, since it stems
from a biblical verse, which is unusual, but does make the connection
between playing and idol-worshiping. Thus Hagar, the Gentile woman,
and her son Ishmael, the idol-worshiper, should indeed be expelled,
lest Isaac learns the bad customs . R. Akiva’s interpretation
is innovative and well focused on the narrative discrepancy.

It seems, then, that the editor/author of this
passage created literary tension by compiling three exegetical motifs
attributed to the school of R. Akiva. The first is perhaps an
original exegesis by R. Akiva, the second, an almost banal one, which
could have been created ad hoc for this passage, and a third, which
is originally an exegesis of a verse in Proverbs, explaining it as
referring to the Isaac-Ishmael story. To these three arguments the
editor/author added a fourth one, which criticizes the previous three
interpretations, and serves as the literary and ideological climax of
the passage.

The issue at hand in the
Tosefta passage is a question of exegetical strategies; Hagar and
Yishmael are considered only in as much as the case serves the
discussion about exegesis. The focus on exegetical technique becomes
even more obvious when we consider the context in which we find this
discussion. The interpretation of Hagar’s expulsion in the
Tosefta is part of a sequence of four interpretations of biblical
verses. The three other verses are Numbers 11:22, Ezek 33:24 and Zach
8:19.^²¹

The passage from the Tosefta about the four
exegetical topics over which Rashbi and R. Akiva differ is quoted
within the discussion of the water of bitterness.^²²Why was this digression inserted into the text of the Tosefta?
In order to answer this question, it will be useful to check the
parallel passage in the Mishna.

2. Mishna Sota 5

In the parallel chapters in the Mishna, the
sequence of the four exegetical issues over which R. Akiva and Rashbi
differ is missing. But we do find, in the middle of the discussion
about the water of bitterness, a different digression, one that
presents some of R. Akiva's interpretations of biblical verses.^²³

Here is a summary of this digression:^²⁴

1. Within the halakhic discussion of the
unfaithful wife, R. Akiva introduces a new personage to the
discussion, the lover; the lover, says R. Akiva, is also tested by
the water of bitterness. Akiva learns this by using a sophisticated
interpretive method on verses from Numbers (5:11-31), understanding
this from an appearance of the same word twice in one biblical
passage. R. Yehoshua and R. Yehuda, the Prince, both make reference
to opinions of earlier sages, which agree with R. Akiva’s
conclusions. The agreement with established authorities also imparts
authority to R. Akiva’s interpretation. This passage has an
introductory nature and it is a later addition to a list of Akivian
interpretations.^²⁵

2. Next, R. Akiva learns the rule that a
loaf of bread, which was in an impure vessel, is itself impure. This
understanding agrees with what was known already to R. Yochanan son
of Zakai, a rabbi of great authority who lived one generation
earlier, but it contradicts a straightforward command found in a
biblical verse (Leviticus 11:33). R. Akiva again uses a sophisticated
interpretive move to show that the rule is, in fact, based on a
biblical verse. R. Yehoshua is happy with R. Akiva’s
interpretation.

3. R. Akiva explains a contradiction
between two biblical verses regarding the distance that one is
allowed to walk on a Shabbat. The halakhic rule is a known one, and
it is not dependant on any biblical verse; R. Akiva’s
innovation is the connection he makes between the rule and the
biblical verse.^²⁶

4. R. Akiva uses a sophisticated
interpretation of an apparently surplus word in the biblical text to
explain how the reading of the “song of the sea” (Exod
14:1) was performed: Moses uttered one sentence, explains R. Akiva,
and the Israelites repeated it. In opposition to R. Akiva’s
interpretation, R. Nehemia claims that both leader and people were
singing together at the same time. The implication of R. Nehemia’s
opinion is that the Holy Spirit descended on the Israelites as much
as it did on Moses; otherwise, how could they have known what to sing
along with Moses.^²⁷

5. Yehoshua son of Hyrcanus, who is
presented as a pupil of R. Akiva (Rosen-Zvi 2006b, 117), interprets a
verse from Job to prove that Job worshipped God out of love and not
out of fear, as was understood by R. Yochanan son of Zakkai. The
former learned this from a straightforward reading of a verse in the
book of Job. Yehoshua’s interpretation is sophisticated and
follows the Akivian method of interpretation.

In his study of this Mishnaic chapter, Ishai
Rosen-Zvi concluded that the intention of the digression from the
halakhic topic was to show and praise R. Akiva’s method of
interpreting the scriptures. What is perhaps implied, but not
specified strongly enough in Rosen-Tzvi’s article is that the
important factor in R. Akiva’s innovation is not his method of
interpretation, but the fact that he insists on having a biblical
support for all halakhic rules.^²⁸
The need to combine halakha with biblical context is so strong, in R.
Akiva’s view, that one may even use “extreme”
interpretive methods to reach this goal. Chapter 4 of the Mishna is,
then, a celebration of the Akivian method as a peak of interpretive
virtuosity, which was not surpassed before or after R. Akiva, all
with the purpose of combining halakha and Scripture into one cultural
unity.^²⁹

The currently accepted scholarly view about the
development of rabbinic culture is that by the end of the Second
Temple Period the Pharesean law had developed into an independent
body of halakhic rules, while the priestly culture was more closely
linked to the biblical text. In the Tannaitic culture, which
inherited the Pharesean one, the urge to connect the halakha with
scripture rose again, and this urge arose in proximity to R. Akiva,
whether initiated by him or brought by him to a new level.^³⁰

Seeing the chapter of the Mishna in the light of
this cultural trend, it is all the more interesting to see what the
focus and the aim of the parallel chapter in the Tosefta is.

In the parallel passage in the Tosefta the
compiler seems to react against the glorified image of R. Akiva as
portrayed in the Mishna, by making every possible move to downplay
the greatness of R. Akiva. In the parallel Tosefta passage, we find
the following steps. The introductory passage where R. Akiva is being
praised at great length is omitted in the Tosefta. Omitted also is R.
Yehoshua’s praise of R. Akiva in the ruling about impurity. R.
Akiva’s name is omitted from the ruling about the
Shabbat-distance. With regard to “the song of the sea,”
in the Tosefta it is accepted that the Holy Spirit entered all of the
Israelites (this is the opinion, which in the Mishna was supported by
R. Akiva’s opponent). To this the Tosefta adds a wealth of
opinions regarding the manner of singing and, by so doing, the
opinion of R. Akiva is but one of many possible ones, and not the
preferred one as it was in the Mishna. With regard to Job’s
faith, in the Tosefta we find the opinions of two other rabbis, not
of R. Akiva, which prove that Job’s faith was based on love,
not on fear; R. Akiva’s name is omitted again.

Here is a schematic representation of the sequence
of the two corpora, the Mishna and the Tosefta:

Mishna Sota Chapter 5	Tosefta Sota, Chapter 6
1: An introductory halakhic passage about the unfaithful wife, with a ruling by R. Akiva who uses his interpretation of a verse to prove a halakha.	(the whole passage is missing or omitted)
2. R. Akiva rules regarding impurity; R. Yehoshua praises the ruling.	The same ruling of R. Akiva as in the Mishna. R. Yehoshua’s praise is omitted.
3. Akiva’s ruling about the Shabbat limit; the mixture of halakha and scripture is not accepted by R. Eliezer son of Yosse, who is younger than R. Akiva, hence showing R. Akiva’s uniqueness (Rosen-Tsvi 2006b, 104).	The same ruling of R. Akiva as in the Mishna, but attributed to another sage (Yehuda son of Petiri); R. Eliezer’s opinion is also presented as referring to scripture, so R. Akiva’s virtuosity loses its uniqueness.
4. R. Akiva’s sophisticated interpretation of the singing of “the song of the sea” is contrasted to R. Nehemia's method, which is a simple understanding of the verse, but implies that the Holy Spirit impregnated all the Israelites during the event.	(this appears as the last passage in the Tosefta) After stating that the Holy Spirit descended on the Israelites in the desert (as was the opinion of R. Nehemia in the Mishna, who opposed R. Akiva), the Tosefta introduces a wealth of opinions about the manner of singing “the song of the sea,” thus reducing R. Akiva’s opinion to merely one of many.
5. R. Akiva’s interpretation of the Job story: he worshipped out of love, not fear.	(Appeared before “the song of the sea” issue in the Tosefta, in order to enable a longer discussion of the “song of the sea” later on?) The discussion here does not include R. Akiva's interpretation at all; it is quoted by another sage.
The chapter is finished; next comes a new chapter about a new halakhic issue regarding jealousy.	Here the text about the four issues on which R. Akiva and Rashbi differ is added. This text fundamentally criticizes R. Akiva’s interpretive method.

In the Tosefta, then, R. Akiva’s opinion is
omitted from as many passages as possible and, when not omitted, his
is reduced to one among many other opinions or, at the very least, it
is not being praised.

In contrast to the parallel in the Mishna, the
compiler of the Tosefta seems to take for granted the fact that a
halakha has to be supported by an interpretation of a biblical verse,
an issue which was represented in the Mishna as Akiva’s
novelty. What is being criticized in the Tosefta is the particular,
sophisticated deconstructive method of interpretation, a method that
was presented in the Mishna as necessary in order to find a biblical
support for a halakha that was not rooted in the biblical text. Akiva
needed the sophisticated deconstructive method in order to bridge the
gap between the halakha that he held as valid, and the scripture,
which he also took to be authoritative. For Rashbi the connection of
the authority of both halakha and scripture is unquestionable, but
the sophisticated method of interpretation does an injustice, as he
shows, to the authoritative biblical figure Abraham. Rashbi,
therefore, rejects the Akivian method of interpretation.

This is true, not only with regard to the story of
the expulsion of Hagar, but also with regard to the other three
interpretive issues that appear in the Tosefta.^³¹

The passage about the expulsion of Hagar and
Ishmael is not halakhic, but narrative. The motive behind the debate
over it is not legal, but concerns cultural narrative: how can we,
the rabbinic culture, accommodate the character of the father of the
nation as it appears in the biblical text. It is less
institutionalized than halakhic topics, but instead has more to do
with portraying cultural identity and its nature. In other aspects,
however, it does tackle the same issue as the halakhic debate. And
this is: what kind of exegetical strategies are accepted, and what is
the rabbinic view of R. Akiva’s exegetical activity and his
readiness to resort to extreme exegetical technique in order to
combine halakha and scripture, or in this case, halakha and cultural
narrative.

So far we have dealt with the exegetical motif
about the expulsion of Hagar and Ishmael, knowing that the real issue
at hand was the exegetical method itself. But once accepted as part
of the authoritative literature, these exegetical motifs, together
with their literary context, have been reused in other contexts. Such
is the case with the exegetical motif of Ishmael the Idol-Worshiper,
which found its way into another discussion in the Tosefta, where the
household of Abraham is the focus.

3. Tosefta Sota 5: Is this a text?

The image of Ishmael as an idol-worshiper,
which was a motif exemplifying the interpretive method of R. Akiva,
is found at another place in the Tosefta, just one chapter before
that discussed above. This occurs while discussing the same general
halakhic topic: the drinking of the water of bitterness by an
unfaithful woman (TSot 5-6).

After discussing the question, that is, after what
kind of family arguments must the woman drink the water of bitterness
(TSot 5:1-5), along with some other domestic issues (TSot 5:6-11),
the text refers to one particular type of domestic quarrel about
which the rabbis refrain from making any judgment. This is the case
in which a woman asks heaven to mediate between herself and her
husband. An example of such a quarrel is the one between Abraham and
Sarah about the expulsion of Hagar. In the biblical text, Sarah does
seem to ask for heavenly intervention in the verse (Gen 16:5), “May
the Lord judge between you and me.” The quarrel between Abraham
and Sarah, as it is represented in this rabbinic passage, does not
focus simply on the request for heavenly intervention, but the accent
is on the fact that each of the parties promotes his or her line of
action by invoking the argument, “If we do not do as I suggest,
the name of heaven will be desecrated.”

The deviant topic and the self-coherence of the
passage both suggest that we have here an independent textual unit
that was incorporated into the Tosefta. This passage appears in all
witnesses of the Tosefta, including a Geniza fragment. For our
purpose, this passage is interesting because it uses the exegetical
motif of Ishmael as an idol-worshiper.

Here is the passage, Tosefta Tractate Sota,
Chapter 5 (according to the Vienna ms.):

1. If a woman says to her husband:
“Heaven will [decide] between my [opinion] and yours,”
they [the couple] will ask for [a heavenly intervention] between
them.

2. As we find regarding our mother Sarah,
who said to our father Abraham: “May the Lord judge between you
and me.”

3. Indeed she said this to him: “Expel
this maid-servant and her son.”

This teaches that our mother Sarah saw
Ishmael building bemas, and hunting grasshoppers and
sacrificing and burning incense to an idol.

4. She said: “Lest my son Isaac
will learn this, and will go and worship in this manner, and the name
of heaven will be desecrated by this.”

5. He [Abraham] said to her: “After
one acquits a person, one convicts him?

After we made her a queen and we made her
a lady and we brought her into this greatness, we will send her away
from our home?

What will people say about us?

Will not the name of heaven be
desecrated?”

6. She said: “Since you say that
this is a desecration of heaven and I say that this is a desecration
of heaven,

God will decide between my words and
yours.”

7. God decided between her words and his,
as it says: “Everything that Sarah tells you, listen to her
voice.”

8. ^³²Why
is it written, “everything”?

This teaches that [God] decided in the
second time as He did in the first instance: as in the second
instance it was a testimony regarding Hagar, so in the first instance
it was a testimony regarding Hagar.^³³

Following the initial statement about the
nature of the dispute and its heavenly solution (§1),^³⁴
the discussion between Abraham and Sarah regarding Hagar is used as
an example of such a dispute (§2). We find, then (§3), a
gap-filling story telling how Sarah saw Ishmael worshipping idols.
The sentence gives a description of Ishmael’s action, similar
to R. Akiva’s formulation in Chapter 6, which was discussed
above. An additional narrative (§4) tells how Sarah wants to
keep the bad influence away from Isaac, lest the name of heaven be
desecrated by Isaac’s worshipping foreign gods. Abraham, on his
part, claims (§5) that since he and Sarah raised Hagar to the
status of a lady and a mistress (that is, a legitimate wife), sending
her away would make a bad impression, apparently referring to people
who will speak evil of Abraham’s family and as a result also
about the God of this family. Also, in such a case the name of heaven
will be desecrated. Since both parties invoke the argument of
sacrilege, Sarah suggests (§6) letting God make the decision.
And indeed, says the Tosefist (§7), God intervened, and made the
decision that Sarah's opinion should be followed. God’s
decision is made clear in Gen 21:12, where He tells Abraham:
“Everything that Sarah tells you, hearken to her voice.”

So far, the narrative of this Tosefta passage
seems fluent and logical, the arguments seem complete and there is no
need for any further remarks. But at this point we find an additional
sentence (§8): Why does it say, “everything that
Sarah says?” Is Abraham supposed to obey Sarah in everything?
The answer given is that “everything” here means that
Sarah’s opinion with regard to Hagar should be followed in the
first instance as it was in the second.

At this stage the reader is reminded, if he or she
did not realize it before, that in the biblical narrative there are
two instances in which Hagar found herself in the desert, one in
Genesis Chapter 16 and the other in Chapter 21. In the first
instance, she ran away to the desert because, after treating Sarah
with disrespect, Hagar was tortured by Sarah and eventually escaped
to the desert. In the second instance, Hagar was expelled by Abraham
following Sarah’s request, after seeing Ishmael “playing.”
In this context the statement in Section §8 of the Tosefta is
clear: Just as God instructed Abraham to obey Sarah regarding the
expulsion of Hagar in the second instance (Chapter 21), so should
Abraham have accepted the expulsion of Hagar to the desert in the
first instance (Chapter 16), which is what Abraham actually did.

In the previous paragraph I was trying to “make
sense” of a passage in the Tosefta. But the truth is that the
argument is not smooth and the narrative is not fluent. In Chapter
16, where the first time Hagar went to the desert is recounted and
where we find the verse, “Let God judge between me and you,”
Ishmael had not yet been born, so it is hardly probable that Sarah
would see him building an altar and sacrificing grasshoppers to
idols. Furthermore, Isaac had also not yet been born, so Sarah could
not have been worried about the effect of the unborn Ishmael’s
customs on the un-conceived Isaac.^³⁵

It is possible to conjecture that Sections 3 and 4
are a later addition to the argumentation, added by an unlearned
scribe or editor. But, if we omit Sections 3 and 4 from our
narrative, we will lose Sarah’s argument for the whole textual
unit, namely, the desecration of the name of heaven.

It is more plausible to conjecture that originally
Sarah used a different argument to support the expulsion of Hagar,
perhaps an argument that proves that, if Hagar stays in the house, a
sacrilege will result. This would parallel nicely with Abraham’s
argument that sending Hagar away (by letting Sarah torture her) would
also result in sacrilege, making the dispute undecidable, and in need
of heavenly intervention. Such an intervention is called for by Sarah
with the words, “May the Lord judge between me and you.”

If this analysis/conjecture is true, we can assume
that the original passage was a combination of two exegetical
motifs.^³⁶
The first is an exegetical motif concerning the words of Sarah, “May
the Lord judge between me and you,” explaining these words as
referring to a dispute that Abraham and Sarah had concerning Hagar.
The two arguments brought up by the two parties (the one by Sarah,
which is lost, and the one of Abraham) are gap-filling stories, that
is, describing a scene not told in the biblical text.

In the latter part of the passage, we see a second
exegetical motif that is focused on the verse, Gen 21:12, “Everything
which Sarah says, hearken to her voice.” The word “everything”
is explained as referring to the two times Hagar was sent/escaped to
the desert.^³⁷

Once Sarah’s proper argument was replaced by
the argument that Ishmael was an idol-worshiper, the narrative became
incoherent. But the fact that it was replaced shows that this
exegetical motif about idol worshipping had gained a status of
authority, at least in the eyes of the scribe or the editor who chose
to replace the original argument with this one. The lexical similarly
between the “idol worshipping” motif here and in Chapter
6, suggests that it was influenced by the phraseology found in
Chapter 6 of the Tosefta.^³⁸

Concluding Summary

In this article I studies the two passage
about Hagar that are found in chapters five and six of the Tosefta. I
was using the method created by James Kugel, of analyzing the
exegetical motifs that developed around particular biblical verses.
Through this analysis I found that the passage in Tosefta Sota
chapter six, which is the earlier of the two passages, is a
construction made up to present Rashbi’s exegetical method as
superior to three others that stem from the school of Rabbi Akiva.
The three motifs presented as Akivian are of varied exegetical value:
One (Ishmael is an idol-worshiper) is a innovative exegetical move on
the part of Rabbi Akiva, another (Ishmael is a man-slaughterer) was
originally an explanation of a verse from Proverbs, and still another
(Ishmael was incestuous) seems redundant. In contrast, Rashbi’s
exegesis (Hagar was expelled because Ishmael wanted a greater
inheritance) does not deconstruct the verse, but learns about its
meaning from its context.

The passage about Hagar in chapter five of the
Tosefta also discusses Hagar’s expulsion, and Sarah’s
request for divine intervention in solving the argument between
herself and Abraham. The text as is found in chapter five is
incoherent. It seems to mix two biblical stories: Hagar’s
flight into the desert (found in Genesis 16) and the expulsion of
Hagar (Genesis 21). My conjecture was that an unlearned copyist
replaced an original argument of Sarah’s, which is now lost,
rendering a whole Tosefta passage incoherent. This could happen only
because the exegetical motif of Ishmael as an idol-worshiper took on
authoritative status and became a fixed textual unit.

This study shows the vitality of the exegetical
motifs as an cultural unit that could serve as a agent conveying
cultural content and readily available to be used and reused by the
sages. The exegetical motifs could be shifted from one context to
another, they served as a genres in which ad hoc units were created,
they were used as pieces of information in a debate (between Rabbi
Akiva and Rashbi) and they were combined to create larger textual
units. It seems that the knowledge of exegetical motifs, and the
creation of new ones, was a natural part of the culture of these
sages.

Bibliography

Bacher, W., Die exegetische
Terminologie der judischen Traditionsliterature, Leipzig 1889,
rprt. Hildesheim-Zurich-New York 1990

Bergman, Y., 1972, “Gzera Shawa
Mahi?”, Sinai 71: 24-30 (Hebrew).

Boyarin, D., Intertextuality
and the Reading of Midrash, Bloomington and Indianapolis 1994

Epstein, J.N., Introduction to Tannaitic Literature:
Mishna, Tosephta and Kalakhic Midrashim, Jerusalem 1957 (Hebrew)

Fraenkel, J., The ways of the Aggadah and the
Midrash, Tel-Aviv 1996 (Hebrew)

Halbertal, Moshe, interpretive
Revolutions in the Making: Values as interpretive Considerations in
Midrashe Halakhah, Jerusalem 1997 (Hebrew)

Hammer, R., Sifre: A Tannaitic Commentary on the Book
of Deuteronomy, New Haven and London 1986 (Hebrew)

Heinemann, J., Aggadah and its development,
Jerusalem 1974 (Hebrew)

Kugel, J. L., 1983, “Two introductions to
midrash”, Prooftext 3: 131-155

Kugel, J. L., In Potiphar’s House: The
Interpretive Life of Biblical Texts, Cambridge MA and London 1994

Kugel, J. L., The Ladder of Jacob: Ancient
Interpretations of the Biblical Story of Jacob and His Children,
Princeton and Oxford 2006

Levinson, J., “Literary
approaches to midrash”, Current Trends in the Study of
Midrash, 189-226, Leiden and Boston 2006

Lieberman, S., The Tosefta, According to Codex
Vienna, with Variants from Codices Erfurt, Genizah Mss. And Edition
Princeps (Venice 1521), New York 1973 (Hebrew)

Kahana, M.,“The Halakhic Midrashim”, in: Sh. Safrai et al
(eds.) The Literature of the Sages, 13-26, Assen 2006

Rosen-Zvi,
I., 2006a, “The Tractate of Jealousy: A forgotten Tannaitic
Polemics about Marriage, Freedom of Movement and Sexual Control”,
Jewish Studies Internet Journal 5: 21-48
(http://www.biu.ac.il/JS/JSIJ/5-2006/Rosen-Zvi.pdf)
(Hebrew)

Rosen-Zvi, I., 2006b, “Who Will Uncover the Dust
from your Eyes: Mishnah Sota 5 and R. Akiva's Midrash”,
Tarbiz 75: 95-127 (Hebrew)

Strack, H.L. and Stemberger, G., Introduction to the
Talmud and Midrash, Minneapolis 1996

Werman, C., “Oral Torah vs. Written Torah(s):
Competing Claims to Authority”, Fraade, Steven D., Shemesh,
Aharon & Clemens, Ruth A. (eds.), Rabbinic Perspectives:
Rabbinic Literature and the Dead Sea Scrolls, 175-197, Leiden
2006

Yadin, A., 2003, “4QMMT, Rabbi Ishmael, and the
Origins of Legal Midrash”, Dead Sea Discoveries 10:
129-149.

Friedman, Sh.A., Tosefta Atikta – The
First Pesach Tractate: Parallels of the Mishna and the Tosefta, a
Commentary and a General Introduction, Ramat-Gan 2002

1The
Rabbinic culture is believed to be the heir of the Pharesean culture
of the Second Temple Period, and gained a place of prominence once
the Temple was destroyed and the priestly class lost its ruling
status giving it authority over the Holy Text. See, for example,
Werman 2006, 105-107.

2The
term exegetical motif was coined by J. Kugel; his definition of it
is: “An exegetical motif is the underlying idea about how to
explain a biblical text.” In using this term, and on many
other points, I am following the method developed by Kugel in two of
his books, namely: Kugel 1994, 1-11, 247-270 and Kugel 2006, 4-7.

3The
translation here is of the Vienna mss.; see Lieberman 1973. The
differences between the Erfurt manuscript and the other textual
witnesses have no bearing on what is said in this article. Other
studies concerning this passage are: Heinemann 1974, 189-190;
Fraenkel 1996, I, 89-92; Hammer1986, 402; Epstein 1957, 261 (all are
in Hebrew).

4The
Hebrew root צחק
(meaning “to laugh,” “to play,”
“to engage in a sexual act”). In the passage under
discussion it is interchangeable with the root שחק,
the two roots being phonetically close, perhaps even identical in
rabbinic Hebrew.

5The
word bema is of Greek origin; it means (as in Greek) a high
place intended for sacrifice.

6Here
the root שחק
is used in the words of the sage.

7The
root שחק is
used in the biblical text, and not צחק.

8Here
also the biblical text has the verb from the root שחק
and not צחק.

9The
description of Ishmael as “laughing” seems to parallel
Isaac’s name: while Abraham names his second son “laugh”
(יצחק),
assuming that he will inherit from him, the older son (Ishmael)
laughs unexpectedly, and by so doing indicates what his intentions
are. I thank Reuven Kipperwasser for this observation.

10A
gap-filling story (also called “midrashic expansion”or
“exegetical narrative” in the scholarly literature) is a
rabbinic narrative that fills in what is conceived as a gap in the
biblical story. These narratives can take the form of a description
of events that are not mentioned in the biblical text, or a dialogue
of the characters that is not quoted in the Bible; these help
explain the wider context of the biblical narrative or add more
details to it. The gap-filling stories are, in fact, a very common
interpretive technique in rabbinic literature. Frankel
1996, 287-322; Levinson 2006, 207-208; Boyarin 1994. 39-49.

11See,
for example, MHul 8:1 or MAZ 2:7 for eating and TShab 12:5 for
hunting. Maimonides even decided that sacrificing grasshoppers was
not forbidden; see, Mishne-Torah, Hilchot Avodat Kochavim,
3:4, and Rabad’s critical remark there. I thank Prof. Admiel
Kosman, Prof. Jon Levinsohn, Prof. Menahem Kellner and the partially
anonymous K. Hain for helping me on this point.

12In
the Talmud this act is presented as a childish game on the part of
Ishmael, one mimicking a real sacrifice by using grasshoppers
instead of larger animals; see BT AZ 51a, where the context is a
condemnation of grasshopper sacrifice. S. Lieberman thinks that what
is meant here is real idol-worshipping and not a childish game; see
Lieberman 1974, 665, about lines 91-92.

13Some
scholars think that these opinions, other than that of R. Akiva, are
late additions. Lieberman 1974, 671 does not accept this conjecture.
Sifre Dvarim, Paragraph 31, which has this passage as well,
only has R. Akiva’s interpretation.

14Stemberger
1996, 22, 23.

15The
idiom, “conquering the roofs and torturing the women,”
refers to anal copulation with both male and female partners, the
women not being married to him. See Lieberman 1074, 670.

16Bacher
1990, under various entries; Kahana 1006, 13-26. The term that is
usually used as a name for this method is “analogy,”
gzera shawa in Hebrew; however, see, regarding the
problematic nature of the concept and this expression, Bergman 1972,
24-30.

17
TBMen 29b.

18A
very superficial check resulted in 27 occurrences of “a matter
understood by its context/end” in rabbinic compilations of the
Late Antique and Early Byzantine Periods, as opposed to around 300
occurrences of “analogy” (Hebrew: Gzera Shawa)
and some 650 occurrences of “a minori ad
majus” (Hebrew: Kal va-Homer) in the same corpus.

19These
three sins appear three times in the Tosefta. Thus we read (TSanh
6:6) that the Sodomites committed them, and as a result they would
have no share in the world to come. The Israelites of the First
Temple Period also committed these three sins, and were punished by
being expelled from their country (TMen 13:22). It is emphasized
that these sins were committed only in the past and that, later in
the Second Temple Period, not these but other sins caused the
expulsion (namely loving money and hating each other). In the
Mekhilta, the three sins are attributed to Gentiles only
(Mekhilta Beshalach, Vayehi, Ptichta,
concerning the nations of the world; Mekhilta Yitro,
BaChodesh 2, concerning the Egyptians). See also: TAZ 8:4 (as part
of the seven sins of the sons of Noah).

20This
custom was called “back referencing” by James Kugel
(Kugel 1994, 261).

21Since
all the other verses do not concern Hagar, I will not discuss them
in this article.

22According
to the biblical rule concerning the “water of bitterness”
(Numbers 5:12-31), if a woman is suspected by her husband of being
unfaithful, she is tested by drinking water of bitterness in a
ritualistic manner; if the water causes bitter pain in her and some
other symptoms, she is accused of being unfaithful. According to the
rabbinic rule, the woman is then forced to divorce without receiving
the compensation to which she is entitled as a divorcée. If
the water does not harm her, she is acquitted of blame (about this
rule and its application in rabbinic culture; see Halbertal 1997,
94-113; Rosen-Zvi 2006a, 21-48).

23I
mostly follow the analysis of the chapter as presented in Rosen-Zvi
2006b, 95-127.

24Msot,
Chapter 5.

25Rosen-Zvi
2006b, 118-122.

26The
state of affairs is somewhat more complicated; for a full
description; see Rosen-Zvi 2006b,
102-104.

27The
fact that the Holy Spirit descended on the Israelites is not
mentioned in the Mishna, only implied. I emphasize it here because
this topic will come up again in the Tosefta, as a reaction to the
Mishna; see Rosen-Zvi 2006b, 105, notes 51 and 113, note 87.

28Rosen-Tzvi
2006b, 101, p. 102, near note 36, and in many other places where
“tradition” vs “midrash” is mentioned.

29The
praising of R. Akiva’s system is done mainly through the voice
of R. Yehoshua, who is a senior of R. Akiva, which is probably also
the voice of the editor of the Mishna; see Rosen-Zvi 2006b,
123-126 and his previous analysis of particular passages.

30Except
for Rosen-Zvi’s work about this, see also Werman 2006,
105-107; Yadin 2003, 131.

31Of
the other three biblical verses in which we find a debate between R.
Akiva and Rashbi, which are not discussed here, two are narrative
issues, and the last is halakhic. It could be that we have here the
midrashic tendency of “increasing in importance”: the
three first issues, which are narrative, serve as introductions to
the “real” issue, which is the halakhic one, and in this
case, a calendric one. See also Lieberman’s remark, Lieberman
1974, 669, when talking about one of the mss. of this parasha: “And
the meaning is that Rashbi did not debate with R. Akiva about legal
issues, only in the case of the fast of the tenth [month], and the
other things are merely narrative” (my accents).

32I
am skipping the sentence “it is not
written ‘everything’ (she’eyn talmud lomar
kol),” which I think is a comment made by a scribe or a
reader wondering about the nexus which the midrash creates between
Gen 16:5 and Gen 21:12. The comment was incorporated by a later
scribe into the text.

33The
textual versions that read “about Hagar,” instead of “a
testimony about Hagar,” are unnecessary corrections. See
Lieberman, 665, about lines 108-110. Sarah’s claims against
Hagar are taken as a testimony made by a woman, which is usually not
accepted as a valid testimony except about issues that concern her
own body and some domestic issues. In this case the testimony was
accepted by God.

34See
also MNed 11, 12, a similar demand on the part of the woman, which
was explained differently in later sources. See references to such
sources in Lieberman 1974, 663-664.

35Lieberman
expends much effort to explain the existence of this passage here.
Many early sources quote the Tosefta passage as found here, and most
do not react to the discrepancy described above (except one source,
a Geniza text, which declares that Sarah saw Ishmael sacrificing
grasshoppers in a vision; see Lieberman 1974, 664-665).

36See
Kugel 1994,254.

37In
Sifre on Numbers, the same question, “Should
Abraham obey Sarah in everything?” is answered by
saying that the dot above the word “between you,” ביניך
(in the mesoratic text), means that Abraham's
obedience was only required in the case of Hagar.

This seems to be a secondary use of
this Tosefta passage that avoids the discrepancies in the biblical
text, which the passage here suffers from, as will be further
explained.

38It
is possible that this exegetical motif existed separately and was
incorporated independently into both passages of the Tosefta that
were studied above. I tend to think that this is the less likely
possibility. The exegetical debate between R. Akiva and Rashbi might
have been an independent textual unit, as can be argued from its
existence, albeit in a different formulation, in Sifre
Dvarim, Passage 357 in Chapter 34 (p. 425 in Finkelstein’s
edition).

Nov 19,
07 Page 1

Summary: Yadin, 4QMMT, Rabbi Ishmael, and the origins of Legal Midrash

2008-05-07T04:37:00.000-07:00

Yadin, Azzan, “4QMMT, Rabbi Ishmael, and the Origins of Legal Midrash”, Dead Sea Discoveries 10,1 (2003), 129-149.

summarizes some of A Shremer article “they didn't read the sealed book”.
Qumranites called to “return to the torah of Moses” against the “dorshey chalakot” which is a pan on “dorshey halachot”.

Pharisees had a paradosis, a non-scriptural halakha, and the rabbis (tannaim) tried to connect it to the scripture.

Azzan criticizes Shremer for seeing rabbinic culture as unified.
He will show similarities between R. Yishmael's halakha to the MMT's.
p. 133
R. Ishmael and the marginalization of extra-scriptural tradition
R. Ishmael's statement that “in three places halakha bypasses the scripture” means (as in other occurrences of such an expression about three cases) that in all other cases halakha is supporting/supported [by] the scripture.
Also: halakha here means “to Moses from Sinai”.
The fact that this occurs in only three cases, is marginalizing the extra-scriptural halakha.

This is problematic, since oral-torah is accepted as rabbinic identity marker.
But in R. Ishmael's midrashim there is no extra-scriptural halakha, except the three cases mentioned above, as opposed to Akivian midrash which cites many such halakhot.
R. Ishmael never cites another rabbi from whom he learned a halakha [in the mishna and tosefta].
The talmud mentions a teacher to R. Ishmael – R. Nehunia ben Haqana, who taught R. Ishmael exegetical technique (kelal ufrat), and not extra-biblical traditions.
D. Halivi thinks that there was not Mishna of the school of R. Ishmael.
So: R. Ishmael does not transmit extra-scriptural traditions. He has not [non exegetical] teachers, and his school did not produce non-midrashic compositions.

Will show cases of expressions which in Akivian compositions mean extra-biblical traditions, and in the Ishmaelites mean biblical ones.

a. shma.
In akivian tradition: if a man commits five sexual offenses in one bout of forgetfulness, does each count separately? The answer: we didn't hear about these particular offences, but we heard (an extra biblical tradition) about others, and it is analogous to the cases you mentioned.
In Ishmaelian tradition: in the Mekhilta the words “we didn't hear” refer to scriptural exegesis.

b.
dispute between Hillel and shamai about a testimony of a woman who returned from abroad regarding her husband's death.
The house of shammai accepts her testimony, because sages spoke about a similar case (a woman who returns from the harvest).
In the mekhilta – a similar formula is used but with regard to the scripture and not to what sages said.

c. stam
in the mishna it is what was heard from sages without explanation. In Ishmaelite midrashim stam refers to scriptural statement made without explication.

d. leqayem (to establish)
in the mishna it refers to explanation of extra-biblical tradition “leqayem divrei chakhamim”. In Ishmaelite midrashim the same verb refers to an interpretation which supports a biblical verse

Other cases where in the Mishna we have “we didn't hear” (in a case of a woman coming from abroad testifying for the death of her husband refers to earlier sages, and in the Mekhilta it refers to a verse.

p. 140
R. Ishmael is closer to Qumran's דורשי התורה than to the דורשי הלכות/חלקות.

Rabbi Ishmael and Priesthood
It is recognized that R. Ishmael is from a priestly origin (in the Tosefta [T. Hal. 1:10] he swears by the priestly garb of his father; and it appears also in amoraic sources). A summary of all the sources/traditions is in Porton, The Traditions of Rabbi Ishmael, Brill 1982
Geiger supports the view that R. Ishmael was priestly; he argues that Ishmael represents an older halakhic tradition that was overlaid with the new Aqivan one. Hirshman also supports this opinion (tora lekhol baei olam), who worked primarily with aggadic material. The universalistic view of the torah stems, says hirshman, from the ishmaelic school, which had its roots in second temple priesthood.
Yadin claims that Ishmael was priestly and rabbinic, and this explains the marginalization of extra-scriptural halakha in his Makita and sifre. This also explains Ishmael's closeness to Qumran in general, and MMT in particular.
He will show it by the shared legal traditions, the term “katuv” and the addressee of MMT.

Shared legal tradition:
a. the first fruit is for the priests in MMT 62-63 and sifre numbers 5 (Horovits, 8)
b. non-ritualistic slaughter should be in Jerusalem according to MMT (B 25-280). Ishmael and Aqiva argued about it, Ishmael siding (with MMT) that it is forbidden to eat Hulin, while Aqiva claimed that it was made allowed in the desert, and the prohibition concerns only the Qedashim.
c. MMT prohibits the slaughter of pregnant animals; the status of the embryo is the issue at stake. R. Ishmael and Qumran claim that the embryo is an animal for itself (as opposed to others). (this is following E. Eshel's analysis).
d. concerning an impure person who baptized, the level of his purity (following Kister's analysis): R. Ishmael and Qumran agree.

The role of Katuv
(after Qimron): the word katuv in MMT does not introduce a scriptural citation, and in the mishna it does. It is not always true about the mishna. Even bacher makes a mistake when saying that “hakatuv” and “amra torah” are synonymous. Only the latter precedes a biblical quote. Hakatuv refers to heqqesh (analogy).
In rabbi Ishmael midrashim “hakatuv” does not introduce a biblical quote, but an alternative or a hermeneutical move. In MMT the word hakatuv functions in the same manner.

Addressees of MMT
who are the “you” of MMT. The you are priests, but the legal positions attributed to this group largely correspond to he Pharisees positions recorded in the Mishna. Probably a priestly group which was sympathetic toward Pharisaic rabbinic circles, forerunners of the school of R. Ishmael?

Cana Werman, "Oral Torah vs. Written Torah(s)

2008-04-24T06:39:00.000-07:00

Werman, Cana, “Oral Torah vs. Written Torah(s): Competing Claims to Authority”, Fraade, Steven D., Shemesh, Aharon & Clemens, Ruth A. (eds.), Rabbinic Perspectives: Rabbinic Literature and the Dead Sea Scrolls, 175-197

What is called “priestly halakhah” is based on the Pentateuch, with laws fashioned in accordance to it, and developed to resolve contradictions and vagueness in it.
In the middle of the second cent. BCE the Pharisees gained more influence in Jerusalem, by the Hasnoneans, and their (Pharisees) halakhah also became influential in the official arena.
Those of the priests who did not want to comply with the new situation retreated to the desert and are known as “the Qumran sect”.
Many rules of the sect are the regular priestly rulings. But for the rest, by their withdrawal from the Jerusalem Temple they cannot claim authority which derives from the Temple or from their civil position.
We find two claims of authority in Qumran:
1. in Jubilees and the Temple Scroll we find the view that the interpretation of the Torah was given to Moses in Sinai. It is the Torah and Te'uda (predestined history): expansion and interpretation of the first Torah, is to stand before the people as a witness when the correct interpretation is forgotten in the future.
2. the view in the Damascus Document is that the teacher of righteousness was instructed by God and developed the tools for interpretation which he imparted only to the members of the sect.

Rabbinic claim to authority:
The Pharisees interpreted and made new laws, but it is not clear what is the origin of their law; some of it must have been quite old.
The Tannaim probably continued the Pharisees culture. They decided about halakhah independently from the Scripture.
They did claim to have a second Torah, an oral one (the Qumran second Torah was written).
Werman claims that the oral Torah was a Sinaitic one (even though there is no such explicit claim), by analyzing two sources.

One (Sifra 112c, ms. Vatican 31) where the tanna qamma claims that there are two torot, and R. Akiva says that there are many; this shows the view of two torot as axiomatic.

Two (Sifre Deut, Finkelstein, 408) where we find the claim for two torot pronounced by the authoritative sage Rabban Gamliet; we also find here the reducing of the priestly authority to a few legal incidents only.

Sometime we find talk about a single Torah in rabbinic literature, for example Sifre Deut 306 (and other examples) where the Torah and the interpretation came as one unit, and the Scripture consists of all halakhot and midrash.

R. Akiva rejected the notion of two torot.

R. Ishmael and Claims to Authority
R. Ishmael accepts (or at least does not reject) the notion of two torot.
Werman checks R. Ishmael's methodology regarding two halakhic issues, and compares it with the view of Qumran and of R. Akiva.

1. Law of the beautiful captive
in Qumran (temple scroll) she is forbidden to prepare food, so practically she is forbidden to marriage. This is against what is stated in the bible (deut 21:10-14).
Midrash Tannaim (of the school of Ishmael) accepts the biblical law, and is also aware of a possibility for her to convert (which is an innovation not found in the biblical text).
The way of R. Akiva:
turns the words “mother and father”, which she has to lament, into “idolatry” (Sifre on Deut 213), which in fact leaves for her only the option of conversion. R. Akiva finds a prooftext for his opinion.

2. the covering of the blood (slaughtering a nonconsecrated animal).
The Qumran view accepts that animals can only be slaughtered at the altar in the temple. This is restricting the biblical permission granted in Deuteronomy 12 (which contradicts Leviticus 17:11).

R. Ishmael accepts both biblical views, not interpreting one in light of the other (as they did in Qumran). (ms Oxford assigns the lift of the prohibition to the sages, not to the Scripture).

R. Akiva finds no contradiction between Leviticus and Deuteronomy, claiming that it was always possible to eat meat anywhere.

R. Akiva assumes the unity of the Torah, and uses interpretative methods to arrive at this unity, and R. Ishmael subjects the Scripture to a careful reading, and on the other hand accepts a set of halakhot circumventing (or expands) the Scripture, an alternative to it.

In light of these findings Werman suggests to reexamine some concepts:
1. Halakhot
the Tosefta speaks of two type: halakhot with scriptural support (torts, the Temple service, purity laws et al.) and those without it, and then they have a very scanty scriptural support, but there are many halakhot (Shabbat, Festival offerings).
R. Jehoshua endeavors to impart authority to the non-supported halakhot as well.

The Mishna does not declare the non-supported halakhot as non-supported, because they are supported (on a scanty scriptural basis). It maintains the unity-of-Torah approach, not allowing other authorities for the halakha.

The term halakha in the Tosefta applies to all laws, scriptural or other; in the Mishna – only to laws that are based on the scripture (since all halakhot are).

2. prohibition against writing:
oral torah is an early tannaitic concept. Attributing the tradition to the fathers, which ultimately is derived from Sinai. There is no actual prohibition on writing, but it fits well for it not to be written (“Nontheless the advocate of the 'oral Torah' claim might be cautious when writing, especially during the writing of nonmidrashic [=non scriptural] collections of laws).
Also the R. Akiva's approach (no two torot, unity of the Torah) would not issue a blanket prohibition against writing.

Summary (which is not summarized here)

Summary: Moshe Idel on Moshe Gaster

2008-02-29T04:23:00.000-08:00

אידל, משה, משה גסטר, המיסטיקה היהודית וספר הזוהר, תעודה כא-כב (תשס"ז), חידושי זוהר: מחקרים חדשים בספרות הזוהר, תל אביב, 111-127

Idel, Moshe, “Moses Gaster, Jewish Mysticism and the Zohar”, Teuda 21-22 (2006), 111-127.

A
about moshe gaster, a romanian jew, 1856-1939.
was highly educated. Had a collection of mss, some from the genizah, part of the collection was sold to the british library in london, another part was sold to the john reylends library in manchester; mss. Of the religious slovanian and romanian literature was sold to the national academy in romania.

B
he held the theory of the “stream of traditions” from the east which influenced european culture: a stream from the east in late antiquity, which reached as far as england, was parallel to the streaming in of the bible. This was innovative at the time, when scholars saw euroean culture as a mixture of greek- and roman culture and the bible, but did not like to include influence of non biblical hellenistic or oriental culture, which was carried by “secondary elites” (p. 113). He was criticized and banned at the time.
His theory did not agree with the standart folklorist approach, which sees an influence from folkoristic stratae of society into the more official and educated stratae, but he saw the influence of book from the east, not of “lower culture”.
Gaster had no students, so he was not influencial; the interest in his theories returned in the 80's of the 20th century with regard to european culture, not so with regard to jewish culture.

C
gaster also studied jewish mysticism. Here his contribution was completely forgotten, he was not mentioned by scholem, tishbi, weblowsky and others.
Gaster thought that kabbalah is ancient; he sees manichean influence on it. He wrote non-apologetically about anthropomorphism in early judaism (pp. 116-117). he was a student of Gertz, but did not accept his opinion about Ramdal as composer of the Zohar.
Gaster also thought that the Bahir was not written in Europe
Kabbalh to him was a merging of philosophy and agadah.

D
about the Zohar – gaster thought that it was a compilation of oriental texts by an unskilled editor; the zohar itself has more than one mystical approach. He held this view for 40 years.
Idel finds that there is a contradition in Gaster's method between his belief in the “midrash of shimon bar yochai” and the assumption that there was manichean influence on the zohar (medieval manichean influence, katharic or bogomillic).
New assessments about the zohar, of liebes, and ronit dishon (meroz) opened a new page (but they also don't rely on Gaster). Some of Gaster's conclusions seems to have more than a grain of truth in them (apocryphal writings embedded in the Zohar, manichean influence, the Zohar being an almost accidental collection).

E
Gaster was brave and innovative. His theory of stream of traditions is the motive behind his scientific work – his publishing of particular compositions such as the book of yerachmiel, maise-buch (yiddish) and the exempla of the rabbis.
Gaster preceded Herzl in establishing settlements in Palestine. He understood that the Ugandan proposition was a mistake, but he didn't have a good political understanding of the scholarly world, so he didn't have an academic position.

Summary of Rosen-Tzvi, Mishna Sota chapter 5 and Akivian midrash

2008-01-09T04:55:00.000-08:00

Ishay Rosen-Zvi, “‘Who will uncover the dust from your eyes?’: Mishnah Sotah 5 and R. Akiva’s Midrash”, Tarbiz 75 (2007), 1+2, pp. 96-128
in Mishna Sota 5 there are four drashot, about impurity, Eruvin, the reading of the song of the sea and the faith of Job.
He will prove that the first mishna does not belong to this sequence
the common thing about these four derashot is the manner of interpretation of R. Akiva; this whole sequence is praising it. Akiva's method is being contrasted with a minimalistic methods of other rabbis.

1. impurity of a third vessel: a major halakhic topic of the period. Ribaz had a certain halakha: a loaf in an impure vessel is not only impure, but also littering other things. This halakha is different than what is said in Lev. 11. he was afraid that later generations will cancell this halakha because it is not based in scriptures. [some important bibliography about this]. This halakha is not found in qumran (because it is tradition and not scriptures). R. Akiva is the first rabbi to connect this halakha to scriptures. R. Akiva is praised by R. Yahoshua. Akiva can make a drasha which Ribaz couldn't because of the different system of drashing: Ribaz just saw that the scriptural halakha was different; Akiva interpreted.

2. eruvin: there is a contradiction in the scriptures (Num. 35, 1000 ama in verse 4, 2000 in verse 5). again a halakha which Akiva connected with a verse.
Then comes R. Eliezer's drasha, which explains the verse but does not connect it to a halakha. This sheds sharper light on Akiva's interpretation, being an opposition to it: Akiva's system of deconstructing the verse (take it out of its context). The novalty of Akiva is that he learned about “tchum shabbat” from this verse, which is not the original meaning of the verse.
This was probably done before in qumran, where they understood the difference from two types of tchum shabbat because of this contradiction between these verses. And R.-Tz. Brings other examples. R. yossei, in this passage, brings the halakha but does not connect it to verses. The innovation of R. Akiva is that he connect the pharasian halakha with a vese. So the passage in the mishna here praises R. Akiva's system: it is not tradition vs scriptures, but Akiva's combination of the two which is praised; this system is not accepted by R. Eliezer son of R. Yossey the Galilean.

3. The song of the sea. The tosefta version is longer, and used to understand the mishna. This is wrong. The version in the tosefta and in the mekhilta, and in the later sources (talmudim) are elaborations on R. Nehemiah's system, which is not a respons system at all. So in the mishna the “reading of the Shma” is an oral reading by cantor and congragation together; in the tosefta it is different (p. 112).
explaining the mekhilta (is this explainig the tosefta too?): because the holy spirit rested on them they all sang the song; this is learned from the verse, and not from any drasha. So it is in the yerushalmi.
So again this section in the mishna is presenting R. Akiva's system of interpreting the verse and leaning about the respons-type reading of the song of the sea, in opposition to R. Nehemiah's system.

{R.-Tz.'s interpretation of the Tosefta's passage: the system of response is accepted, there are three systems of it: hallel like a small-one, hallel like a big-person and like in the shma. Only that there is no respons in the shma here, but a drasha is attached to the end of R. Nehemiah's statement, a drasha about the pasuk at hand, which is not really explaining his words; so is the case in the mekhilta}

4. the faith of Job. This drasha is different from the others in stucture and rabbi. It is of a different sources and was added here because of R. Yehoshua's reaction. it presents a mahloket between ribaz (learning from the simple meaning of the verse that Job feared God) and Yehoshua son of Hyrcanus who presents a sophisticated drash: learning from another verse of Job. This passage is praising the sophisticated reading vs. the simple one, like in the first case – the more “modern” reading (of Yehoshua) is better. It is not that love is better than fear in this passage {me: it will be so in the tesefta}. We don't know who this yehoshua was, but he is presented as a continuer of R. Akiva. The theme (readiness to give your life for God) is tpical Akivian.

5. the first mishna: the sota and her husband. Here there are two drashot of R. Akiva about “sota”. This passage seems to be stuck in the middle of chapter about “drinking women”. The difference between the previous chapter to the next is that in chpater 4 women don't drink because of their high status, and in chapter 6 they dont drink because of issues of testimony about them.
At the end of chapter 4 is discussed the relationship between the suspected woman and her suspected lover. R. Akiva brings in the lover-character into the mishna. He says 1. that the water she is drinking check him as well and 2. that she is fobidden to him. R. yehoshua says about the second case that a former sage said it too; Rabbi is saying a drasha which seems to be similar. {discussing some scholars that dealt with this passag}. R.-Tzi's understanding: the first mishna was added later to the four drashot learned above, and was formed as an intro to them all, by having Akiva's system praised by R. Yehoshua (by comparing it to an ancient sage), and having Rabbi's statement added as a contrasting opinion, in a manner similar to what is done in the four later drashot.

So the whole corpus is presenting the greatness of R. Akiva's system, in relation to earlier and later rabbis.

A sophisticated group of r. akiv'as drashot; in each one drasha is brought, first in halakha and then in aggada. They are presenting the akivian method: addition of “lemor”; addition of “vav”; learning halakha from a contradiction; and from a difference in staement (eyno omer). The akivian nature is in the focusing on single words and even letters, and is being made clearer by presenting a different views (which always read the verses in a simpler manner). The other opinions are brought in order to show the greatness of R. Akiva. There is a development in the drashot of R. Akiva (note 141); there is also a picture of a developing system of drasha from one generation to another: ribaz, r. yehoshua, r. akiva, yehoshua son of hyrcans. This image of r. Akiva, as a peak of drashic abilities, appears also in the talmudim. The greatness of R. Akiva is not only in his drashic-abilities, but in his using it in order to establish halakhas which already exist (discussing a passage from Sifre Num. about the kohanim with “mumim”). This connection could be, in fact, the voice of the editor (which is heard in the statements of R. Yehoshua).
Kahana wrote about this as well: the Tannaitic ever-growing tendency to connect halakha to and midrash. In our passage the heros of this tendency are R. Akiva and R. Yehoshu, but the connection made is between halakha and scriptures.

Some seventh century links

2007-12-14T23:45:00.000-08:00

European (mostly English) history

Wikipedia

Mainly Church history (western)

Nestorian Church

reference to an article about coins in Palestine

an article by DAMIAN BRACKEN about Rationalism and the Bible in Ireland

Books

Haldon, J.F., Byzantium in the Seventh Century: The Transformation of a Culture

Palmer, Andrew (trans.), Seventh Century in the West Syrian Chronicles

Summary of Kugel's "Two Introductions..."

2007-12-13T23:59:00.000-08:00

James L. Kugel, “Two introductions to midrash”, Prooftext 3 (1983), 131-155

an illustrating example of midrash Kugel brings b. ber 4b, about the psalm which is missing a nun.

He is asking the (good) question: is it not obvious to him that he is doing an injustice to the text, twisting it around to say its opposite? (p. 79) mea mater sus est mala (can mean: my mother is a bad pig, or, Go, oh mother, the pg is eating the apples).

about prophecy – it was established on earlier messages.

About prophets eating the word of God. The word of God already becoming a text. Prophecy of the second temple period was much divided, omen seekers and self appointed prophets were common. The hope of the restoration of Elijah rose. The scrolls at this period does not enter the prophet anymore. But the written word exists (p. 83).

it is the period of the manipulators of the texts: copyists, soferim, interpreters.

Interpreting starts with reproducing the text itself (p. 83).

Daniel is an (inspired) interpreter of the words of Jeremiah.

III

God function in history in creating single time events that change history. There are reasons to ghings. the cyclical view of time also exists in early Jewish/late biblical culture, for example in the book of ecclesiastics (and other wisdom literature).

Apocalyptic books. Here the end-of-time is parallel to the beginning of time. In this system biblical events are models to the events of the end-time.

A paragraph which was not clear to me (p. 87, the second): archaizing details and manners of so many post biblical compositions, attest to the desire to dress up present reality in biblical trappings (I want more details about this).

Allegorized Bible of the Alexandrian Judaism – has its own way: de-particularization of the text.

All of these exhibit the urge to connect one's own world with the world of the Scripture (p. 88).

[some more about the notion of time in {early} second temple period].

This lead to seeing the Bible not as “past”, there is not continuity between biblical time and ours, the Bible is “Other” time; this view entails the possibility of exegesis.

Differences between midrashic approach to Scripture and other approaches, with regard to time (pp. 98-90). talks about the allegoric approach and the apocalyptic.

“Now later rabbinic Judaism might seem similarly eschatological, for it awaits ... the arrival of God's anointed ... in this sense it appears to have much in common with the apocalyptists. But this has nothing to do with the stance of its exegesis ... For midrash, as opposed to Qumranic pesher and other “political” exegeses, generally views Scripture as a world unto itself.”

The bridge between the biblical and the midrashic is the halakha (not messianism). This is not a bridge of time.

midrash has much in common with the early exegetes mentioned, also from within the Bible itself.

Trying to (not) define midrash (p. 91).

counting genres of midrash (targum, sermons, homilies, exegetical prayers and poems etc.)

midrash is concerned with surface irregularities of the text.

In the later midrash, it looks like they first had the solution then they looked for the problem (p. 93).Midrash is an exegesis of biblical verses, not of books.

Brings the example of the song of songs rabbah – the line the God is the lover and Israel is the beloved is usually followed, but it is not the only line. The beloved is allegorically both Israel and God; this present no problem. We find in the midrash host of opinions.

Why concentrate on the verse level? Because it is the level appealing to the memory (p. 94).

(the compilations are deceiving because they seem to treat the whole book, but the bits are quite atomistic). “and so, midrashic explications ofindividual verses no doubt circulated on their own, independent of any larger exegetical context”. Describes the example of the exegesis of ps. 81:1 (pp. 95-98).

checking variations in some collections, of the passage which he studied in the beginning (or is it the one studied only now?).

Yes, it is indeed the issue of the seventy languages that Joseph new, which was discussed just before. Now learning the passage from B. Sota 36b.

The independence of the midrashic units enables them to be incorporated in different contexts (p. 99).

even though the first initiative of the midrash is the exegeses of a verse, the story told in the exegeses can eventually become part of the narrative canon of the culture, and is mentioned without reference to the verse it originally explained.